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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DIRECT FEDERAL MILITARY
CONSCRIPTION
HARROP A. FREEMANt
At no time in American history has so much attention been focused
upon military and war making powers. A large part of the last session
of Congress has centered on congressional versus presidental power in
areas concerning the need for a formal declaration of war before war
powers become effective, the limitation of military expenditures, the
impropriety of the Southeast Asian conflict, and the need of an all-
volunteer military establishment. Massachusetts and several other states
have either adopted or proposed laws to prevent use of their citizens
abroad in "undeclared" or "unconstitutional" wars; the Massachusetts
case was recently rejected by the Supreme Court.' That Court has
heretofore avoided these constitutional issues, though lower courts feel
they should be resolved.2
In 1944, as World War II drew to a close, the author published
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 174, special law (Supp. 1970). The United States
Supreme Court has denied Massachussetts leave to file a bill of complaint. Mass. v.
Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970).
Many similar provisions have stood in the original states from the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution. E.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 5 (McKinney 1948) (formerly
New York Bill of Rights 1787):
No citizen of this state can be constrained to arm himself, or to go out of
this state, or to find soldiers or men of arms, either horsemen or footmen, with-
out the grant and consent of the people of this state, by their representatives in
senate and assembly, except in the cases specially provided for by the constitution.
of the United States.
Futher examples may be found in CoNN. GEN. STAT. Rsv. §§ 27-13, -16 (1961); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 308 (1953) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 65, § 308 (1957) ; MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 33, §§ 3, 39, 40; N.H. Ray. STAT. ANN. §§ 110-a:5, -14, 111:13 (1964) ; and
VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 44.1-85 to 87.
Typical of the extensive control of the militia (state manpower) are N.Y. CONST.
art. XII, §§ 1, 2, 6; N.Y. MIm. LAw §§ 1, 2, 5, 6a, 7, 22-3 (McKinney 1953).
Fox v. Brown, 402 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969), may
be taken as typical of cases raising the issue of the place of and rules controlling the
National Guard in the military establishment.
2. The Supreme Court's avoidance of the question here posed may be seen in Hol-
mes v. United States, 387 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936 (1968) ;
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, reh. denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968). Typical of the
lower court cases suggesting that the issues are serious and should be faced include,
United States v. Crocker, 420 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1011
(1970).
For a historical survey of intriguing draft law cases see the following: Arver v.
United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1917); Cox v. Wood, 247 U.S. 3 (1917); Fox v. Brown,
402 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969); United States v.
Crocker, 420 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1011 (1970).
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"The Constitutionality of Peacetime Conscription."' The argument in
that article was historically accurate but relatively unsophisticated in
establishing the distinction between "war" and "peace." In the twenty
five years that have since followed we have nominally been at peace.
While engaging in undeclared foreign "wars" and "U.N. actions,"
we have had some form of military conscription in order to meet these
commitments. Inherent in my 1944 presentation was the thesis that
except for "calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions,"' the intendment of the
Constitution was that the "army" should be raised only by voluntary
enlistment. Thus, I did not conceive that a peacetime conscription could
be constitutional. Today we need a much more sophisticated approach,
but not necessarily resting on a war-peace dichotomy. An approach which
sets forth civil and military priorities in light of various constitutional
provisions and which is justifed by our theory of government is there-
fore needed. This article does not deal with the constitutionality of
Vietnam as an undeclared war and like issues having some bearing on
present conscription. Others have written on these issues.'
Consequently, this article must reflect the relation of the "militia"
and "raise army" clauses of the Constitution, the constitutionality of con-
scription for an undeclared "war" or for conflict brought about without
an attack upon the United States and conducted outside the United
States' territory, the proper extent of presidental power, the extent of
state control over its own military manpower, and the necessity of a
congressional declaration of war before any "war" powers come into
operation. The author proposes that the following "rule" should be
adopted:
a) Except by using the Militia clauses, Congress may
raise an army and naval force only by voluntary enlistment; b)
Congress can "draft," "conscript" or "call forth" any of the
militia of the states for only three purposes: to execute the
laws, suppress insurrection and repel invasion. In the event that
this occurs, restrictions would be placed on the use of draftees
3. 31 VA. L. REv. 40 (1944).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
5. There have been several excellent articles touching upon this problem. See Fried-
man, "Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understadning, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 1493 (1969); see also Velvel, War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable, and
Jurisdictionally Attackable, 16 KAN. L. REV. 449 (1968) ; The Amendment to End the
War: The Constitutional Question, submitted by Senators McGovern, Hatfield, Goodell,
Cranston and Hughes on H.R. Doc. No. 17123, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1970) ; F. WoE-
.1UTH, THE VIETNAM WAR: THE PRESIDENT VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION (1968).
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and the applicability of military law; c) The President may
repel sudden attack, but only Congress can declare war or
commit conscripted troops to a war abroad; d) The military is
always subordinate to civil authority; e) Only Congress has
control of the military purse.
It is this author's contention that the Supreme Court should examine
the issues raised by the above rule. In doing so it should give primary
attention to the intendment of the constitutional provisions, giving
proper effect to each power. Where manpower is used in an undeclared
foreign war in which no possible reliance on the militia clause can be
used, it is essential that the issue of conscription be resolved. The present
situation calls for a clearer statement of the interrelation of all of the
constitutional powers as they involve various types of conflict. The
history and discussion herein presented serve as a contribution to such
an analysis and as a justification for the proposed rule.
Source of Militia and Army Clauses: The English Experience
Proposals in the British Parliament to conscript for the regular
army were defeated in 1704, 1707, 1756, 1757, 1778, 1779. The British
militia was organized by the militia law of 1757 and, consistent with
our concept, it was to be used only for the purposes of enforcing laws,
suppressing insurrection and repelling invasion: the militia was not to
serve abroad.6 We may also note that the English Bill of Rights requiring
yearly applications to the legislature to maintain an army suggests the
6. Freeman, supra note 3, at 68-69; 29 Geo. 2, c.4 (1756) ; 30 Geo. 2, c.8 (1757) ; 18
Geo. 3, c.53 (1778); 19 Geo. 3, c.10 (1779). J.R. WESTERN, THE ENGLsI MIATiA IN
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 250 ff. (1965).
The Agreement of the People enacted by the House of Commons in 1648 and still
part of the British Constitution when we adopted our Constitution provided:
We do not empower them [Parliament] to impress or constrain any person to
serve in foreign war, either by sea or land, nor for any military service within the
kingdom; save that they may take order for the forming, training, and exercis-
ing of the people in a military way, to be in readiness for resisting of foreign
invasions, suppressing of sudden insurrections, or for assisting in execution of the
laws; and may take order for the employing and conducting of them for those
ends; provided, that, even in such cases, none be compellable to go out of the
country he lives in, if he procure another to serve in his room. S. GARDINER,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 1625-1660, at
368-69 (3rd ed. 1899).
It takes little reading to see the complete similarity of the provisions to our Constitution:
"forming, training, exercising"=our "training" left to the States
"employing and conducting"=our "calling forth," "governing," and "employed"
"resisting of foreign invasions, sup- = our "to execute the laws of the Union,
pressing of sudden insurrections, or suppress insurrection, and repel in-
for assisting in execution of the vasions."
laws"
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restriction we adopted on raising and maintaining an army: appropria-
tions should not be for more than two years.7
One of Blackstone's treatises provides further insight by drawing
a clear distinction between "armies" and "militia."8 The King's "armies"
were provided by feudal knights who rendered forty days of military
service each year in consideration of the "fees" or plots of land granted
by the King. The first assize of arms,' and subsequently the Statute of
Winchester,10 required citizens to keep and bear arms for "militia"
service. The "militia" was used for local defense, and could not be used
outside their shires. 1
Several commentators have viewed the "impressment" into the
English army of vagabonds, paupers and unemployed as a forerunner to
conscription. However, these people were not considered "free men."
All free men belonged to the "militia" and were protected by its pro-
visions. Non-free men were compelled by law to work, and if they found
no other work they were given work as mercenaries in the "army.""
Source of Militia and Army Clauses: The Colonial Experience
The colonial period possessed the following features :"3 All colonies
provided for a militia and most of them also had "armies" composed of
volunteers and mercenaries. The militia was confined to the borders of
the colony and could only be used to repel invasions. The Continental
Congress did not attempt to conscript manpower into the Continental
Army. Rather, the army was composed of volunteers and "draftees"
from the militia. However, it was understood that only the individual
colonies could exercise the power to conscript. These forces, the volunteers
and "draftees," constituted the "Continental Line," with the militia
element always kept separate. 4
7. See E. RIDGES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 246 (8th ed. 1950); THE FEDERALIST, No.
26, at 166 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
8. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 409.
9. 27 Henry II (1181).
10. 13 Edw. 1, c.6 (1285).
11. When Henry VIII began to supervise the militia, Parliament denied that the
King had any such power. Moreover, the keeping of "armies" and attempts to regulate
the militia were recognized in THE FEDERALIST as a principal grievance to the Glorious
Revolution in 1688. THE FEDERALIST No. 26 (A. Hamilton); S. GARDINER, THE CON-
STITUTIONAL DOcUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 1625-1660, at 334 (3rd ed. 1899).
12. 4 Anne c.10 (1704); 29 Geo. II c.4 (1756); 30 Geo. II c.8 (1757); 30 Geo. II
c.25 (1757) ; 18 Geo. III c.53 (1778) ; 19 Geo. III c.10 (1779).
13. For a more thorough analysis see Freeman, supra note 3; Friedman, supra
note 5.
14. Shy, A New Look at the Colonial Militia, 20 Win. & MARY L. REv. 175, 182
(1963); R. WIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY (1967); 2 A. VourM,
BACKGROUNDS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE (Selective Service Monograph No. 1, 1947) [here-
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Consequently, the general opinion as expressed in the Constitutional
Convention and the state debates, was that the colonial-British militia
system was desired and was, therefore, carried into the new Constitu-
tion.15 The only failure of the Continental system intended to be remedied
was the inability of Congress to tax for the common defense and to call
the militia into federal service. 6 In summary, at the time of the Con-
vention "[t]he only type of standing army known to the Framers was
a mercenary, volunteer force, and the only compulsory type of military
service known to them was service in the militia which was confined to
limited and local purposes as it has been in medieval England ..
Meaning of the Militia and Army Clauses:
The Constitutional Convention
Drafts18 of the military-militia clauses coming out of the Com-
inafter cited as Background]; Friedman, supra note 5, at 1504-06; Wiener, The Militia
Clause of the Constitution. 54 HARv. L. REv. 181 (1940) ; Hollander, The President and
Congress-Operational Control of the Armed Forces, 27 MIL. L. REv. 49, 52 (1965) ; 2
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 18 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
For the constitutional provisions of the colonies see F. THORPE, AMERICAN CHAR-
TERS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIC LAWS (1909).
On the "Continental Line" during the American Revolution, see J. HILL,
MINUTE MAN IN PEACE AND WAR (1964); ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, arts. II, IX;
THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton). See Journals of the Continental Congress
(1907), [hereinafter cited as Journals]. Of special interest are: 7 Journals 262-263
(1777) ; 10 Journals 199-200 (1778) ; 13 Journals 299 (1779).
As common background for public interpretation of the constitutional provisions it
needs to be stated that the dictionaries of the period clearly defined an "army" as raised
by voluntary enlistment and paid, whereas "militia" meant "the whole body of men
declared by law amenable to service, without enlistment." See Murray's New English
Dictionary on Historical Principles (1933) ; Webster's American, Dictionary of the
English Language (1828).
15. See, e.g., arguments of Livingston and Hamilton in New York and Wilson and
McKean in Pennsylvania, 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATEs 278-9, 352, 468, 537 (2d ed. 1836).
16. U.S. CoNS,. art. I, § 8, clauses 1, 12.
17. E. CORwIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 71 (1965).
18. 2 M. F.ARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 131 (2d ed.
1937) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND]: Comm. of Detail I:
"That the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the legislative Rights
vested in Congress by the Confederation."
2 FARRAND 135-6: Comm. of Detail III:
"9 ... Militia ... to be disciplined etc. according to the Regulations of the U.S.
... 19. S & H.D. in C. as shall regulate the Militia thro' the U.S."
2 FARRAND 143-144: Comm. of Detail IV: 5. To make war <:(and) >raise
armies. <and equip Fleets.>
12. (To draw forth the) <make Laws for calling forth the Aid of> the militia,
(or any part, or to authorize the Executive to embody them) <to execute the
Laws of the Union, to repel Invasion, to inforce Treaties, suppress internal
Comns.>
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mittee of Detail" at the Constitutional Convention in 1789 evidence
the following: First, raising an army and calling forth the militia was
at all times distinguished. Second, the militia was recognized as a state
rather than a federal organization which was to be used solely for the
purposes of executing laws, suppressing insurrection and repelling in-
vasion. Finally, only Congress was authorized to "make" war.
Tracing these provisions through the constitutional debates, the
following trends and positions developed. First, the words "make war"
were changed to "declare war" expressly for the purpose of "clogging
rather than facilitating war."2 ° Second, the original Pinckney draft for a
constitution contained the language: "militia of the United States."
Since the delegates conceived that there was no federal militia but only
state militia, the phrase "militia of the United States" was dropped.
Thus, "militia" always referred to that of a state; no concept of a general
federal manpower was ever envisioned by the Committee of Detail or
the Delegates."
Another development centered around the power to raise and support
armies. There was general fear of a standing army. The Federalists
wanted to give the Union a small standing army, whereas the anti-
2 FARRAND 158-9: Comm. of Detail VII:
"The Legislature of the U.S. shall have the exclusive Power-of raising a
military Land Force-of equiping a Navy .... ."
"The Legislature of the U.S. shall possess the exclusive Right of establishing
the Government and Discipline of the Militia of-and of ordering the Militia of
any State to any Place within the U.S."
2 FARRAND 167-8: Comm. of Detail IX:
"The Legislature of the United States shall have the Power ... to regulate the
Discipline of the Militia of the several States; to subdue a Rebellion in any
State, on the Application of its Legislature; to make War; to raise Armies; to
build and equip Fleets, to (make laws for) call(ing) forth the Aid of the
Militia, in order to execute the Laws of the Union, (to) enforce Treaties, (to)
suppress Insurrections, and repel invasions ....
2 FARRAND 181-182: Report of Comm. of Detail to Convention:
"The Legislature of the United States shall have the power...
To make war;
To raise armies;
To build and equip fleets;
To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws of the Union,
enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions ;" (also essentially
current provision on organizing and disciplining. See also 2 FAuiRAw 353, 381-2,
391, 388, 576, 595, 656).
19. The Committee of Detail was the drafting committee.
20. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 553-4
(1894-1905) ; I ELLIOT'S DEBATES 246 (1876) ; 5 Id. 443; 2 FARRAND 318-19.
21. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 130 (1876) ; 1 FARRAND 23; 2 Id. 135-36.
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Federalists opposed even this. Moreover, several delegates pro-
posed an absolute prohibition of a standing army in time of peace while
others urged that the peacetime army be limited in number.22 Ultimately
it was decided that since the Union had to pay men to enlist them in an
army, the most effective control was through the purse. At no time was
it suggested that this clause gave power to create an army by means
other than through voluntary enlistment.2
At the Convention in addition to attempting to prevent a large
standing army, allowing for enlistments and controlling the army through
the purse, the delegates made the existing militia system, with one major
change, the core of the United States defense system. They believed that
"who can judge so well of the discharge of military duties for protection
and security of the people, as the people themselves."24 Washington wrote
Congress and various friends that defense could not be successfully
conducted "while the powers of Congress are only recommendatory,"
but he still believed that "a well-regulated militia" should be the American
plan and was "the Palladium of our security."25 Washington's remarks
did result in two original drafts for a Constitution empowering Congress
"to call forth" the militia and authorizing some uniformity of "arming,
organizing and disciplining the militia."2 In the debates it became clear
that there was not to be a United States militia, rather the militia was
to be that of the states and under major control by the states. Even a
resolution to give the federal government power to "make laws for the
regulation and discipline of the militia of the several states, reserving
to the states the appointment of the officers" was unacceptable.2 Further-
more, a proposal reserving to the states only the right to appoint "officers
under the rank of general officers" brought forth a blistering attack as
"absolutely inadmissible." As a consequence, the resolution was not even
22. The suggested maximum figure was approximately 3,000.
23. See, 1 FARRAND 19, 25, 351; 2 Id. 323, 329, 333, 335, 341, 505, 508, 509, 563, 617.
See, Friedman, supra note 5, at 1516; Freeman, supra note 3, at 60-3, 67-9; Wells, The
Draft and the Militia Clauses of the Constitution: A Layman's View, 1969 GUiLD PRAc-
TioNE 27, 28.
24. 2 FA U AND 53.
25. 7 SpAw's WR rINGS OF WASniNGToN 442 (1833-37); VIL s, GEORGE WASH-
INGTON, LETTERS AND ADDREssEs 215 (1909) ; Circular letter from George Washington to
State Governors, June 8, 1783, in 26 WITINGS OF WAsHaiNGT N 483, 494 (1938) ; WASH-
iNGToN, Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, in 26 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHrNGTON
374-98 (1938).
26. 5 ELLOr'S DEBATES 130; 1 FARURA 21, 293, 301; 2 FARRAND 323, 326, 381, 385,
387-88, 617.
27. 5 EIOT'S DEBATES 443; 2 FARRAND 326, 330-32, 352, 368, 377, 380-88, 422, 426.
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seconded.28
Although all agreed that the states should not surrender control of
the militia, it was recognized that some uniformity of organization was
desirable.29 Thus, a compromise was reached which gave the states the
power of conscription and the federal government the power to arm,
organize and discipline. The debates further illustrate that the only place
it was deemed necessary to protect the general citizenry as to compulsory
military service was in regard to the militia clauses, not under the
"armies" clause because those who volunteered had no right to protection.
Thus, all discussion of exemption of conscientious objectors related only
to the militia clauses."0 The last development that should be noted is that
throughout the debates there was a clear distinction between "armies"
and "militias."81
Congressional Action Operating under the "Army"
and "'Militia" Provisions
In December, 1790, when Congress considered the first militia bill
it was conceded that the states necessarily had major control since the
28. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 466; 2 FARRAND 388. DOCUMENTS, 564, 569, 571, 580, 598-
604, 621.
29. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 443-445; 2 FARRAND326, 331, 332, 381, 387, 388.
30. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 424; Freeman, supra note 3, at 80 f; Friedman, mepra note
5, at 1532 ff. The same was true of the discussions concerning courts martial. 1 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES 371; 2 Id. 552; 3 Id. 660; Friedman, supra note 5, at 1530 ff.
31. DOCUMENTS, 115, 567, 666, 725, 924; 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 425; Friedman, supra
note 5, at 1512-13. The above propositions are further supported by the following com-
mentators :
John C. Wells states that in all of the early debates on compulsory military service,
the clauses of the Constitution which were under discussion were those-and only those-
pertaining to the militia. 1969 GUILD PRACTITIONER 27, 29.
Leon Friedman states that the manner in which the militias were organized confirms
the idea that the body of state militias consisting of the citizens at large, and not a
national professional standing army, was intended to be the main military force of the
United States. The debate over the organization of the militia again points out how un-
thinkable it was to the framers that the central government could have any direct power
to draft individual citizens into the general army. Only with the greatest reluctance did
the delegates allow the central government to call the militia into service for specific
purposes. The reason was obvious-a tyrannical central government with a large army
would be able to destroy the hard-won liberties of the people. On the other hand, some
central control was necessary to mobilize the militia for defense purposes and to compel
obedience to the laws. But all the restrictions which the Convention imposed on this
power, the fact that the states would be able to appoint the officers and train the militia,
and the fact that the general government could control the militia only for the purpose of
executing the laws of the Union, suppressing insurrections, and repelling invasions in-
dicate that the framers were quite concerned about the danger of the central government
using its military forces to suppress the freedoms of the people.
After circumscribing the central government's power to draw the militia into federal
service with such careful restrictions, the delegates could not possibly have allowed the
federal government to exercise direct control over the citizens by permitting a draft into
the regular army. Friedman, supra note 5, at 1516-19.
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militia was a creature of the states." When the Militia Act was passed
in 1792 it therefore provided for "exemptions as the legislatures of the
several states shall provide."3 Subsequent statutes likewise recognized
the militia as a state organization, composed of the male citizens "of the
respective States."3 " Remaining in force until 1903, the Act contained
a further limitation that the President could not call forth the militia
without certification of need by either a Supreme Court Justice or
district court judge. The call-up was to be for only ninety days. 3
The first proposal of a federal conscription law in 1815 not only
called forth Daniel Webster's famous attack on its constitutionality
resulting in the defeat of the bill, but it also brought representatives from
various states together at the Hartford Convention where it was declared
that for the federal government to conscript the state manpower was
unconstitutional as circumventing the Militia provisions of the Con-
stitution.8
The first congressional Act provided only for calling forth "the
militia of the State, or states... to repel.., invasion."3  An examination
of the events surrounding the War of 1812 is most instructive. Secretary
of War Monroe proposed that all men between the ages of 18 and 45 be
formed into classes of 100 men each. When men were needed for the
army, volunteers from each class would fill the quota. If the quota was
not met then men could be drafted. Moreover, a draftee could provide a
substitute. Monroe's proposal was not reported out of the Military
32. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 422-4, 438 (1876).
33. 1 Stat. 271 (1792).
34. Act of April 18, 1814, c. 80, 3 Stat. 134; Act of April 20, 1816, c. 64, 3 Stat.
295; Act of May 12, 1820, c. 97, 3 Stat 557; Act of Mar. 19, 1836, c. 44, 5 Stat. 7; Act
of July 29, 1861, c.25, 12 Stat. 279; Act of Mar. 2, 1867, c. 145, 14 Stat. 434; Act of Jan.
21, 1903, c. 196, 32 Stat. 775.
35. 1 Stat. 264 (1792) ; 1 Stat. 424 (1795).
36. "The power of compelling the militia and other citizens of the United States,
by a forceable draft or conscription, to serve in the regular armies, as proposed
in a late official letter of the secretary of war, is not delegated to Congress by
the constitution, and the exercise of it would be not less dangerous to their
liberties than hostile to the sovereignty of the states. The effort to deduce this
power from the right of raising armies is a flagrant attempt to pervert the sense
of the clause in the constitution, which confers that right and is incompatible with
other provisions in that instrument. The armies of the United States have always
been raised by contract, never by conscription, and nothing more can be wanting
to a government possessing the power thus claimed, to enable it to usurp the
entire control of the militia, in derogation of the authority of the state, and to
convert it by impressment into a standing army." (7 Niles's Reg. 307).
37. This was the form used until 1863. Act of Feb. 28, 1795, c. 36, 1 Stat. 424. See
also: Act of May 9, 1794, c.27, 1 Stat. 367; Act of June 24, 1797, c. 4, 1 Stat. 522; Act
of Mar. 3, 1803, c.32, 2 Stat. 241; Act of April 18, 1806, c. 32, 2 Stat. 383; Act of Mar.
30, 1808, c. 39, 2 Stat. 478; Act of April 10, 1812, c. 55, 2 Stat. 705; Act of July 17, 1862,
c. 201, 12 Stat. 597.
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Affairs Committee. Rather, the Committee proposed the Troupe Bill:
there would be twenty-five classes of citizens, each to provide one
volunteer; otherwise it would be taxed.8 The Troupe Bill was abandoned
and the Giles Bill considered. This Bill proposed calling the state militia
-men up for two years. While still respecting state rights to appoint
officers and restricting the use of the men to their state's borders, the
Bill undertook to make the militia part of the national army. This
proposal precipitated an extensive debate. It was argued that the proposal
eliminated the distinction between "armies" and "militia," that it elim-
inated the constitutional limitations on the use of the militia, and that it
eliminated the requirement that armies could be composed only of
volunteers. Thus it was characterized as an "abominable doctrine" with
"no foundation in the Constitution." 9 The proposed bill caused the
states at the Hartford Convention to seriously consider secession. Finally,
the House rejected the Bill and the Senate postponed debate until after
adjournment."
In the Mexican War the militia was deemed constitutionally un-
available for fighting in Mexico since it would neither repel invasion nor
suppress insurrection.41 In the Civil War the militia was first used to
suppress inurrection, with the states restricting service to three months.
The federal government first increased the federal army by volunteers
and then by a combined call for the militia and a federal draft "to con-
stitute the national forces .. . to suppress insurrection and rebellion."42
Lincoln, recognizing that this action prior to congressional approval
might be unconstitutional as an invasion of congressional or state power,
had the assurance of Congress and the states that they would ratify his
action, which they did.43
In the Spanish-American War it was deemed unconstitutional to
call out the militia to serve in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines.
The federal government used only those volunteering for the sepcific
38. J. LEACH, CONSCRIPTION IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICA BACKGROUND
(1952) ; Jeffers v. Fair, 33 Ga. 345, 369-71 (1862).
39. L. SCHLISSEL, CONSCIENCE IN AMmICA 64 ff. (1968).
40. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. col. 89ff. (1814) ; LEACH, supra note 38, at 110.
41. Act of May 13, 1846, 9 Stat. 9; Act of June 18, 1846, 9 Stat. 17; Act of June
26, 1846, 9 Stat. 20; J. SMITH, THE WAR WITH MEXICO 75 (1919).
42. Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 731 ; Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 731.
43. Act of Aug. 6, 1861, 12 Stat. 326; Note: 2,500,000 troops werevolunteers,255,000
were "conscripted" of whom only 56,000 served. Large numbers of true militia served,
as at First Bull Run and Gettysburg. E. UPTON, THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED
STATES 227-31 (1917); 0. SPALDING, THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WAR AND PEACE
249, 235 (1937) ; Presidential Proclamation, June 15, 1863, 13 Stat 733; Message from
President Lincoln to Congress, July 4, 1861, 12 Stat. 326; E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT,
OFFICE AND POWERs (1957); White, The War Powers of the President, 1943 WIsc. L.
REv. 203, 211.
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campaign in service abroad.4" From 1903 to 1908, attempts were made
to provide for an "organized" militia. Known as a "National Guard," it
was composed of volunteers. Yet, it could be called out for only nine
months, and considerable state control was provided. In 1908 the War
Department tried by "agreement" to expand the National Guard's
length of service and its availability for all military purposes "either
within or without the territory of the United States." '48 However, when
there was a plan to use this organized militia in Mexico both the
Attorney General of the United States and Judge Advocate General of
the Army rendered a "well-considered opinion that there was no consti-
tutional warrant for such general Federal use of the Militia beyond the
territory of the United States." 7 In 1916, the National Guard was
"federalized." 'Members signed an oath agreeing to be drafted into federal
service and to serve abroad." Support for this arrangement was based
on the theory that since anyone could volunteer for service abroad, no
inroad was made on the "militia," 'general manpower or states rights.4"
World War I and II
The Selective Service Act of the First World War was declared
constitutional."0 That opinion is of doubtful validity and is based on an
erroneous reading of American history and of the Constitution.5 How-
ever, the draft could have been upheld on the basis of the "militia"
clauses as necessary to repel invasion because of the submarine attacks
44. 0. SPALDING, supra note 43, at 379; W. MiLLIs, TEE MARTIAL SPIRIT 158-60
(1931) ; Act of April 22, 1898, ch. 187, 30 Stat. 361; Proclamation of April 23, 1898, 30
Stat. 1770; Proclamation of May 25, 1898, 30 Stat. 1772; Act of March 2, 1899, 30 Stat.
977.
45. Act of Jan. 21, 1903, 32 Stat. 775; Sen. Rep. No. 2129, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3
(1902) and H.R. Rep. No. 1094, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-38 (1902), which recognized:
The Constitution distinctly enumerates the three exclusive purposes for which
the militia may be called into the service of the United States .... These three
occasions, representing the necessities of a strictly domestic character, plainly
indicate that the services required of the militia can be rendered only upon the
soil of the United States or of its Territories . . . . It was the hereditary fear of
standing armies, as a menace to liberty in time of peace, whish led the framers
of the Constitution to provide that the militia should always remain a militia of
the States. It was never designed to be a militia of the United States, nor under
the control of the President, except when called into actual service under some
one of the above-mentioned contingencies. Id. 22-3.
The report also recognized the propriety of the N.Y. militia refusing to cross the
Niagara River in 1812.
46. Act of May 27, 1908, 35 Stat. 399.
47. See Ansell, Status of State Militia under the Hay Bill, 30 HARV. L. Rnv. 712,
713 (1917).
48. Act of June 3, 1916,39 Stat. 166.
49. Note, The Status of State Militia under the Hay Bill, 30 HARv. L. Rv. 176, 178
(1916).
50. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1917).
51. See Friedman, upro note 5, at 1494-1552.
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on ships of the American flag and because of formal Congressional
declaration of war."
The idea of a peacetime draft was overwhelmingly rejected in the
1920's and 1930's.53 In 1940 German submarines were in our adjacent
seas and threats of attack were rife. An emergency selective service
system was established, but only after extensive opposition on the ground
of its unconstitutionality. Service was limited to the Western hemisphere
on the ground of repelling invasion, and conscription was deemed
appropriate only in times of war.54 Once the Japanese attacked Pearl
Harbor, conscription for World War II could rely not on the "raise
armies" clause but could claim full support from the "militia" clauses as
necessary to repel invasion. However, the cases upholding the Act
failed to draw this distinction.55
Undeclared Wars Abroad
The Korean, and more importantly, the Vietnam (Indo-china)
conflict raise several constitutional questions concerning foreign "wars."
These questions relate not only to the war itself, but also to the use of
conscripted men to serve in such a war. With respect to the constitution-
ality of the war,5 the Supreme Court has consistently held that only
Congress can declare war." In 1966 the State Department issued a
52. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
53. 3 Special Monograph No. 2, 224, 232, 237 (Selective Service System, 1954).
54. Three members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee viewed it as peace-
time conscription and, therefore, dissented from a favorable report. Former Secretary of
War Woodring spoke against it. Senator Vandenburg was "opposed to tearing up 150
years of American history and tradition, in which none but volunteers have entered the
peacetime Armies and Navies of the United States." The vote was 47 to 25 in the Senate,
232 to 124 in the House. The law was limited to one year, no more than 900,000 could be
drafted and they could not be sent outside the Western Hemisphere. An extension of the
draft in 1941 passed the House by a single vote 203 to 202. See Gillam, The Peacetime
Draft, 62 YALE L.J. 498 (1968).
55. See United States v. Herling, 120 F.2d 236 (2nd Cir. 1941); Tatum v. United
States, 146 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Cf. reasoning on peacetime "registration" in Stone
v. Christensen, 36 F. Supp. 739 (D.C. Ore. 1940).
56. For a more extensive analysis of this issue see the following: The Amendment
to End the War: The Constitutional Question (McGovern, Hatfield, Goodell, Cranston,
Hughes), H.R. Doc. No. 7123, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1970) ; Velvel, War it Vietnam:
Unconstitutional, Justiciable, and Jurisdictionally Attackable, 16 KAN. L. Rav. 449
(1968) ; Faulkner, War in Vietnam: Is It Constitutional?, 56 GEo. L.J. 1132 (1968);
Schick, Some Reflections On the Legal Controversies Concerning America's Involvement
in Vietnam, 17 INT'L AND Co, P. L.Q. 953 (1968); Schwartz, Justiciability of Legal
Objections to the American Military Lffort in Vietnam, 46 Tax. L. REV. 1033 (1968) ;
Malawar, Vietnam War Under the Constitution, 31 U. Pin. L. Rav. 205 (1969) ; Reve-
ley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 5 VA. L. REV.
1243 (1969) ; Legality of the United States' Involvement in Vietnam-A Pragmatic Ap-
proach, 23 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 792 (1969).
57. The Amelia, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) : "The whole powers of war being,
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"White Paper"" supporting the President's action in Vietnam. It assert-
ed that in approximately one hundred twenty-five cases the President
has used military force abroad without prior congressional declaration
of war or authorization. While commentators take issue with this report,
we are not here developing this argument." Our focus is on the war-
making power as it relates to the power to conscript.
The Constitution draws the following distinctions relating to the
functions of the President and Congress.
Article II, §2 makes the President the "Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several states, when called into the actual service of the United States."
Article I, §8 grants to Congress the power "to declare War" and the
power to call forth the militia "to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress insurrections and repel Invasions." It can therefore be seen that
the Constitution does not give the President power to declare war.
Although the President, without congressional aid, may be able to use
the standing army abroad or to repel invasion, suppress insurrection or
execute laws, he has been given no power to so call up and use the
militia: only Congress can call forth the militia. In the Constitutional
Convention, when a suggestion was made to give the President the
power to make war, Eldridge Gerry voiced the general feeling of the
Convention that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to
empower the executive alone to declare war."6
It would thus appear that we are faced with the real necessity of
defining the interrelation of all the military powers. This is partly due
to the President's assertion of extensive power, of Congress' attempt to
restrict the President and assert its own power, of state challenge to both,
and of the opposition to the war by a large segment of society. It is
proposed that the aforementioned rule effectively delineates the nature
and scope of the military powers.
We restate the rule here:
by the constitution, vested in congress, the acts of that body can be resorted to as our
guides in this inquiry."
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862) : "By the Constitution, Con-
gress alone has the power to declare a national or foreign war." See also Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
58. See Congressional Record, No. 43 (1966), pp. 5274-5279.
59. See Wormuth, The Vietnam War: The President Versus The Costitietion, CS
DI, CALin. (1968). Professor Wormuth examines each of the cases cited by the State De-
partment and is able to distinguish the Vietnam War. And it may here be pointed out
that SEATO and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution throw the issue back by allowing action
only "in accordance with its [U.S.] constitutional processes."
60. See 2 FARRAND 318. Tns FEDERALIST No. 69 (A. Hamilton) echoed this same
sentiment.
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a) Except by using the Militia clauses, Congress may raise an
army and naval force only by voluntary enlistment; b) Congress can
"draft", "conscript" or "call forth" any of the militia of the states for
only three purposes: to execute the laws, suppress insurrection and repel
invasion. In the event that this occurs, restrictions would be placed on the
use of draftees and the applicability of military law; c) The President
may repel sudden attack, but only Congress can declare war or commit
conscripted troops to a war abroad; d) The military is always sub-
ordinate to civil authority; e) Only Congress has control of the
military purse.
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